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Abstract 
This short paper presents the first attempt to examine empirically the relationship 
between the level of bank liquidity and the structure of the board of directors, in terms 
of board size and independence. A novel database on these board characteristics is 
built that includes banks operating in 10 OECD countries during the period 2000-
2006. We find a negative relationship between board size and liquidity, while the 
impact of board independence is U-shaped. Therefore, we contend that considerations 
linked to these effects can have interesting implications for the design of bank conduct 
and for the quality of bank portfolios.  
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has renewed the interest on bank liquidity risk and 
its associated costs. In a state of anxiety and turmoil in banking markets customer 
deposits can be withdrawn at any time, resulting in bank runs that can lead to costly 
liquidation of assets of even healthy banks. In the present study, we examine whether 
certain characteristics of the board of directors play a role in determining the level of 
bank liquidity. In particular, this paper explores empirically the relationship between, 
on the one hand, the share of a bank’s liquid asset holdings and, on the other hand, the 
size and the composition of the board of directors. Effectively, this analysis brings 
together the literature on the corporate governance of banks (e.g. Francis et al., 2009; 
Berger et al., 2005) and the literature on bank liquidity (e.g. Berger et al., 2009; 
Wagner, 2007).   
Banks hold liquid assets for two main reasons. First, to satisfy the demand for 
new loans without having to recall existing loans or realize term investments such as 
bond holdings and, second, to meet both daily and seasonal swings in deposits so that 
withdrawals can be met in a timely and orderly fashion. Intuitively, this discussion 
relates to liquidity risk, which is known to be one of the most important types of bank 
risk and its proper management has an important role for the health and growth of 
banks in both good and bad times. In general, liquidity must be judged in light of a 
bank’s ultimate ability to fund its obligations. Factors that must be examined include, 
but are not limited to, the volatility of deposits, the degree of reliance on interest-
sensitive funds, accessibility to the money market, compliance with internal liquidity 
policy and the nature, volume and anticipated usage of credit commitments. In short, 
bank managers have to determine the ideal or optimal level of liquidity so that the 
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obligations are met without hurting future profits. In other words, a risk-return 
tradeoff exists, since the more liquid the asset, the less it will earn.  
Recent evidence on non-financial firms confirms that corporate governance 
influences firms’ mix of cash and lines of credit and suggests that the choice of 
corporate liquidity is a channel through which governance works (see e.g. Yun, 2009). 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) also find that firms with good corporate governance 
guard their cash resources better, whereas poor governance results in a quick 
misspend of excess cash in ways that significantly reduce operating performance. 
While a number of studies have looked into the impact of corporate governance on 
bank performance (Choi and Hasan, 2005; Francis et al., 2009; Andres and Vallelado, 
2008), we are not aware of studies that focus on the relationship between board 
structure and the liquidity position of banks.1 This seems odd, as along with 
capitalization, bank liquidity is considered as the main indicator of bank balance sheet 
health. Besides the lack of evidence on the board structure-bank liquidity nexus, this 
study is further motivated by the principles of the Basel Committee (2008), which 
position the board of directors in the heart of banks’ liquidity risk management. For 
instance, the second principle mentions that the board of directors is ultimately 
responsible for the level of liquidity risk of the bank, as well as the way this risk is 
managed. Furthermore, according to the third principle, the board of directors should 
review and approve at least annually the strategy, policies and practices in relation to 
liquidity management. 
A comprehensive study of the relationship between bank liquidity and board 
structure must consider two main identification issues. First, bank-level variables tend 
to persist and liquidity variables are no exception. Failing to account for this 
                                                 
1 The study that is probably closer to the present one is the recent work of Francis et al. (2009), which 
suggests that board characteristics are related to the pricing of loans. 
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persistence may bias the results in an unknown scale and direction. Second and most 
important, a recent strand of literature argues that firm corporate governance elements 
are endogenous in performance and/or risk equations. We try to tackle this potential 
problem by means of appropriate identification methodology. The findings show that 
the impact of board size on bank liquidity is negative and fairly robust across a 
number of specifications and estimation methods. In contrast, the relationship 
between board independence and bank liquidity is found to be U-shaped, implying 
that liquidity increases only after a certain value on the ratio of independent directors 
over total directors is reached.     
We keep this paper as short as possible, so as to place the spotlight strictly on 
the board characteristics-bank liquidity nexus. The rest of the paper is structured along 
the following lines. Section 2 presents the empirical model and describes the dataset 
of our study. Section 3 reports and discusses the estimation results. Finally, Section 4 
offers some policy implications and concludes the paper.   
 
2. Empirical model and data 
The empirical examination of the relationship between liquidity and board 
structure involves estimation of the following equation:  
0 1 2 3 4 it it it it t itLiquidity a a Boardsize a Boardindependence a B a M u= + + + + +  (1) 
where Liquidity is a measure of bank liquidity of bank i at time t, Boardsize is the 
natural logarithm of the number of directors in the board of a bank, 
Boardindependence is the natural logarithm of the ratio of independent non-executive 
directors to the number of total board directors, and B and M represent bank-level and 
macroeconomic control variables, respectively.  
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 To study the relationship between bank liquidity and board size and 
independence as shown in Eq. (1), we build a new database on these two board 
characteristics. This is a challenging issue since such data is not widely available (see 
also Laeven and Levine, 2009). Relevant information is collected by hand from the 
Spencer Stuart Reports.2 Spencer Stuart, founded in 1956, is one of the leading 
executive search consulting firms. It also publishes the “Spencer Stuart Board Index”, 
which contains information on the board of directors of the largest companies within 
the countries that are being covered. This information is gathered from questionnaires 
and annual reports. We end up with a sample that consists of 127 banks operating in 
10 OECD countries (Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, UK, USA) between 2000 and 2006. Therefore, all banks considered 
are based in relatively developed and liberalized banking systems, a fact that enhances 
the comparability of the respective observations. The maximum number of available 
observations is 536, yet some are missing for certain variables. 
As discussed in the introduction, a higher level of liquid assets will enable a 
bank to withstand a temporary loss of confidence on the part of its depositors, but too 
high liquidity levels will result in future losses owing to the holding of excess low-
yield assets. In this paper, bank liquidity is measured alternatively by (i) the ratio of 
liquid assets to customer deposits and short-term borrowings of a bank and (ii) the 
ratio of liquid assets to total deposits & borrowed funds. Both ratios show what 
proportion of liabilities could be met if they were suddenly requested, yet the first 
ratio considers only the relevant short-term liabilities and the second all liabilities. 
Thus, by using both measures we examine whether this maturity issue influences the 
                                                 
2 Since this is a novel dataset, it is available on request. 
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results. Higher figures on the liquidity variables indicate higher liquidity. Bank-level 
data used to construct the liquidity variables were collected from Bankscope. 
In all estimated equations we control for numerous bank- and country-level 
characteristics. At the bank-level we control for bank characteristics that have been 
traditionally interrelated with liquidity and lending decisions of banks. In particular, 
we control here for (i) bank capitalization using the ratio of equity to assets (denoted 
as Capitalization), (ii) bank size using the logarithm of total assets (Size), and (iii) 
provisioning decisions using the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 
(Provisions). Notably, banks decide on the level of the above variables, in relation to 
and, to some extent, simultaneously with their liquidity decisions. Therefore, it may 
be preferable to treat all bank-level controls as endogenous variables. In addition to 
the bank-level variables we also control for a number of structural and 
macroeconomic conditions common to all banks. Specifically, we control for the 
monetary conditions in each country using the annual lending rate (Interest rate) and 
for the level of banking activity using the ratio of bank claims to the private sector to 
GDP (Bank activity). Both these variables were obtained from the Global Market 
Information Database (GMID).  
One particular characteristic of the banking industry is that it is heavily 
regulated. Therefore, when examining problems related to corporate governance 
and/or bank liquidity one has to account for the role of banking regulations in 
balancing the interests of owners, managers and other stakeholders in the society 
(Alexander, 2006). Here, four types of regulations are considered, namely capital 
requirements, official supervisory power, market discipline and activity restrictions, 
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and four corresponding indices are employed to capture these types of regulation.3 
The regulatory indices were constructed using data from the World Bank database on 
“Bank Regulation and Supervision” developed by Barth et al. (2001) and updated by 
Barth et al. (2006, 2008). This approach has been also followed by Fernandez and 
Gonzalez (2005), Pasiouras et al. (2009) and Agoraki et al. (2009), among others. 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the 
present study. Correlations between the explanatory variables are relatively low and, 
thus, multicollinearity is not an issue (see Table 2). 
[Please insert Table 1 around here] 
[Please insert Table 2 around here] 
 
3. Estimation method and results 
3.1. Identification issues and estimation 
Estimation of Eq. (1) is carried out using two panel data methods, namely 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and the generalized method of moments (GMM) for 
dynamic panels proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). OLS is used as the 
benchmark technique, however it may fail to account for a number of identification 
issues that may be present in the board structure-bank liquidity relationship. In 
contrast, GMM (i) accounts for the potential endogeneity of the board structure 
variables, (ii) explores the possibility that liquidity levels of banks persist and that the 
                                                 
3 The capital requirements index accounts for both initial (e.g. are the sources of funds to be used as 
capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? can the initial or subsequent injections of 
capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities? etc.) and overall (e.g. is the 
minimum required capital asset ratio risk-weighted in line with Basle guidelines) capital stringency. 
The official supervisory power index measures the power of the supervisory agencies and shows the 
extent to which they can take specific actions against bank management and directors, shareholders, 
and bank auditors. The market discipline index is an indicator of market monitoring and shows the 
degree to which banks are forced to disclose accurate information to the public and whether there are 
incentives to enhance market monitoring (e.g. absence of deposit insurance scheme, subordinated debt). 
The activity restrictions index is a proxy for the level of restrictions on banks’ activities, determined by 
considering whether securities, insurance, real estate activities, and ownership of non-financial firms 
are unrestricted, permitted, restricted, or prohibited. 
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results are driven by heteroskedasticity and (iii) considers whether other determinants 
of liquidity (i.e. the controls) are also endogenous variables. Among these issues, the 
potential endogeneity of the board characteristics deserves special attention. 
A relatively recent line of literature on firm corporate governance has been 
attempting to establish a relationship between board size and composition, on the one 
hand, and firm characteristics, on the other hand, based upon the costs and benefits of 
the board’s monitoring and advising roles (see e.g. Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 
2008). The main thrust of this literature is that each firm structures the board in a way 
that promotes its own future value, which tends to also explain the future size and 
composition of the board.  As a result, a causal relationship between board variables 
and firm performance when the former are assessed as exogenous should be 
approached with cautiousness. For our purposes, this theory may imply a potential 
endogeneity of board characteristics in the liquidity equation, especially if banks 
structure their boards in a way that future liquidity levels are optimized, which will 
explain the future size and composition of the board. 
The issue of endogeneity is fully solved by the Blundell and Bond (1998) 
GMM technique. In addition GMM also accounts for the dynamics of bank liquidity 
and the potential endogeneity of the bank-level control variables. All these are 
achieved with the help of appropriate instruments. In particular, we employ as 
instruments the second and third lags of the liquidity and of the other bank-level 
variables (i.e. board-structure variables, capitalization, size and provisions), as well as 
the logarithm of the age of board directors (information for this variable is available in 
Spencer Reports).4 In addition, the regulation indices may also be endogenous in the 
liquidity equations, since lower levels of liquidity may trigger increased regulatory 
                                                 
4 We have verified statistically that the correlation of the logarithm of the age of board directors with 
the board structure variables is high, while its correlation with the liquidity variables is low. 
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stringency. Thus, the four regulatory indices are also treated as endogenous variables 
in the GMM regressions (i.e. much like the bank-level variables they are instrumented 
symmetrically with the dependent variable). For the GMM method this treatment of 
the lagged values of independent variables as instruments is validated by the extensive 
discussion and proofs of theorems in Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond (2002 pp. 
16-18). We have examined the sensitivity of our results by additionally or 
alternatively using as instruments the average board size and share of independent 
directors of other banks in the country (for arguments in favour of this instrument see 
the relevant discussion in Laeven and Levine, 2009). The results remained virtually 
the same and are available on request. A Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions 
and relevant AR1 and AR2 tests confirm the validity of the instruments.5 
 
3.2. Empirical results 
Estimation results are presented in Table 3.6 In all estimated equations we use 
country dummies to control for country heterogeneity (for expositional brevity 
coefficients on these variables are not reported). Our variables for the board of 
directors have a significant impact on liquidity regardless of the estimation approach. 
This implies that endogenous effects of board characteristics do not prevail, at least in 
our study. We further test for the preferred model (OLS vs. GMM) using a Hausman 
test, the results being somewhat inconclusive: from the four Hausman tests two favor 
OLS and two GMM. Thus, we report all models. Note, however, that as reflected in 
                                                 
5 If the AR1 test indicates that negative first-order autocorrelation is present, this does not imply that 
the estimates are inconsistent. Inconsistency would be implied if second-order autocorrelation was 
present, but this case is rejected by the test for AR2 errors (see Table 3). 
6 We present regressions with all the control variables. The equivalent specifications including only 
bank-level controls show somewhat more significant coefficients on the board-structure variables (they 
show significance at the 1% level). However, this is probably due to omitted-variable bias. 
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the positive and highly significant coefficient on both the lagged liquidity variables, 
bank liquidity is highly persistent and this seems to rule in favor of GMM estimation. 
[Please insert Table 3 around here] 
Board size has a negative and statistically significant impact on liquidity, a 
result that remains robust across all estimated equations and irrespective of the 
measure used to proxy liquidity. Therefore, it appears - consistent with Yermack 
(1996) and Huther (1997) - that as the number of directors increases there are 
problems associated with coordination, communication, and decision-making. In turn, 
these problems lead to less efficient control and higher liquidity risk or simply 
inefficient decision making concerning the strategy, policies and practices in relation 
to liquidity. We further explored the possibility of a non-linear relationship between 
board size and liquidity (by adding the squared term of the board size variable), 
however no such pattern was identified.  
The relationship between board independence and liquidity was originally 
found to be insignificant (see columns I, II, V, VI), yet adding the squared term of 
boardindependence among the explanatory variables reveals an interesting U-shaped 
link (see columns III, IV, VII, VIII). This is a result that holds both in the OLS and 
GMM regressions and is robust to the different measurement of liquidity. The first 
part of this finding supports the stewardship theory, which argues that the board 
should have a significant proportion of inside directors to ensure more effective and 
efficient decision making (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Bhagat and 
Black (1999) summarize several arguments put forward in the literature as for why 
insiders could be more effective than outside (independent) directors. For example, 
they mention that inside directors are highly knowledgeable about the company’s 
operation; they know the strengths and weaknesses of the firm better than independent 
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directors; they may be better at strategic planning decisions; and they have human and 
financial capital committed to their company. In another interesting study, Coles et al. 
(2008) find a positive relationship between firm value and insider representation in 
high-R&D firms, and suggest that the ratio of insiders can be related to complexity. 
However, the upward sloping part of the relationship shows that these arguments are 
weaker as the number of outside directors increases beyond a certain point. Therefore, 
an increased share of independent directors seems to be useful to monitor any self-
interested actions by managers, an analysis that is consistent with the predictions of 
the so-called agency theory (see Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
In fact, the point at which the relationship between board independence and 
bank liquidity turns positive can be calculated using the absolute value of the ratio 
[(coefficient on board independence)/ (2*coefficient on the squared term of board 
independence)]. The resulting values for the regressions presented in columns III, IV, 
VII and VIII are 3.23, 3.50, 3.72 and 3.48, respectively. Note that in the estimated 
equations we have used the natural logarithm of Boardindependence. In percentage 
terms, the above values are equal to 25.97, 33.11, 41.20 and 32.38. Markedly, these 
ratios are below the average value of Boardindependence in our sample (60.324) and 
this signals that most banks are at the region where the relationship between board 
independence and bank liquidity is positive.     
Concerning the effect of the bank-level control variables we note that 
capitalization is positively related with bank liquidity, implying that higher 
capitalization yields increased levels of liquid assets in bank portfolios. This result is 
consistent with the risk-absorption theory of well-capitalized banks (see e.g. Repullo, 
2004; Von Thadden, 2004). In contrast, the larger the bank, the less is the proportion 
of liquid assets it holds, which may be the result of relationship lending and/or market 
 11
power of banks in making new loans. In turn, all the macroeconomic variables affect 
bank liquidity significantly. A higher lending rate is associated with higher liquidity, 
probably because firms are seeking alternative sources of finance when lending rates 
are high, thus leaving banks with less customers and higher liquidity levels. In 
addition, higher bank claims to the private sector are associated with lower liquidity 
levels, which is intuitive because higher claims imply increased lending and thus 
lower levels of liquid assets. Finally, booming periods are generally associated with 
increased levels of liquidity in the economy and banks are no exception, as projects 
during these periods are funded in an efficient way, borrowers are usually able to 
repay their loans on time and there are fewer bank runs. This is reflected in the 
positive coefficient on the economic growth variable.  
As discussed above, an important set of control variables concerns the 
regulatory environment. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that all the regulatory 
variables exert a significant effect on bank liquidity. Capital requirements have a 
positive and statistically significant impact on liquidity. This can be explained as 
follows. First, in light of stricter capital standards, banks may decide to substitute 
loans with alternative forms of assets (VanHoose, 2007). Such assets, like interbank 
exposures and government securities, are not only less risky but they are also more 
liquid. In addition, looking into bank liabilities, an increase in capital standards may 
decrease deposits (Santos, 2001), mainly because deposits and equity are alternative 
sources of funds for banks. Hence, banks may be forced to substitute equity for 
deposits and issue new equity to meet capital adequacy requirements. This would 
result in a lower proportion of assets being funded by deposits, explaining the positive 
association between our liquidity indicators and the capital requirements index.  
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Official supervisory power is negatively associated with liquidity, and this is 
consistent with past studies reporting a similar impact on various aspects of the 
banking sector (Barth et al., 2002, 2003, 2004). Our findings are also in line with the 
idea that regulations aiming to enhance market monitoring have a negative impact on 
banks’ risk (e.g. Agoraki et al., 2009) and a positive one on efficiency (e.g. Pasiouras 
et al., 2009). Finally, the negative association between bank liquidity and the activity 
restrictions index reveals that fewer restrictions are associated with higher liquidity. 
This is consistent with Haubrich and Santos (2005), who mention that mixing banking 
and commerce can result in liquidity synergies. In a similar context, a shift of bank 
operations from traditional lending to insurance, real estate and securities services can 
result in an internal market and a conglomerate with higher liquidity.7  
 
4. Policy implications and conclusions  
The role of the board of directors in shaping bank behavior has received 
increased attention from academics, market participants, and regulators. It continues 
to receive attention not only because theory on the relationship between the 
characteristics of boards on the one hand and bank risk-taking and performance on the 
other provides conflicting views, but also because empirical evidence on these 
relationships is rather inconclusive. More importantly for our purposes, existing 
studies in banking have neglected the effect that the characteristics of the board may 
have on the level of bank liquidity. However, the level of bank liquidity and the 
associated risk are of special importance to the banking firm, since it is largely related 
with elements such as the volatility of deposits, the degree of reliance on interest-
                                                 
7 Note, however, that we do not suggest that activity restrictions on banks should be eased. Some recent 
empirical studies find that activity restrictions reduce banks’ risk-taking appetite and lower the 
equilibrium risk of failure or the probability of banking crises (see e.g. Delis and Staikouras, 2009 and 
references therein). 
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sensitive funds, the availability of assets readily convertible into cash and the 
accessibility to the money market. As all these elements represent the show-case of 
banks and are notoriously related to many types of banking crises, we ask here 
whether some board characteristics are responsible for influencing the level of bank 
liquidity (i.e. liquidity risk).  
In the present study we examined the relationship between certain 
characteristics of the board of directors and liquidity. We constructed a cross-country 
sample that includes bank-level data on 127 banks that were operating in 10 OECD 
countries between 2000 and 2006. Following the majority of the related corporate 
governance literature, we use as board characteristics two variables pertaining to 
board size and independence. The findings suggest that the relationship between the 
size of the board and liquidity is negative and that the relationship between board 
independence and liquidity is U-shaped. Policy implications are straightforward. 
Banks with larger boards tend to hold a lower level of liquid assets and this may 
suggest that these banks invest a larger portion of their portfolios in risky activities. In 
good times this may increase their profitability; however, in bad times this may 
contribute to a significant increase in the probability of default, especially if a low-
liquidity bank behavior is complemented by low levels of capitalization. As regards 
board independence it seems that there exists a threshold, above which banks with a 
higher share of independent directors hold a higher proportion of liquid assets. 
Certainly, this does not imply that too many independent directors are needed in bank 
boards, as it is generally accepted that too much liquidity is unwanted for banks 
especially during good times. However, this shows that banks with more independent 
directors are more conservative towards liquidity risk. 
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Important extensions to this short paper involve examining whether the above 
findings hold between banks of different type or if they additionally characterize the 
insurance industry, which was also hit from the recent financial turmoil. In addition, a 
promising extension may involve introducing interactions between board 
characteristics and regulations; such an analysis may improve our understanding on 
the bank liquidity-board structure nexus. Finally, if data on other characteristics of 
bank boards is available, one can examine related hypotheses highlighting 
complementary effects of board characteristics on bank liquidity. We leave these 
ideas for future research. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean St.dev Minimum Maximum 
Liquidity (first measure) 27.148 80.209 9.825 128.01 
Liquidity (second measure) 18.736 29.173 9.713 45.210 
Board size 14.144 4.162 6 29 
Board independence 60.324 25.182 5.268 91.256 
Capitalization 10.448 11.850 0.680 94.860 
Total assets 1.47e+08 2.73e+08 48500 1.57e+09 
Provisions 2.328 17.662 -0.515 18.893 
Interest rate 5.891 1.928 2.800 11.300 
Bank activity 0.938 0.367 0.511 1.739 
Economic growth 2.048 1.173 -0.062 5.844 
Capital requirements 5.059 1.376 2 8 
Official supervisory power 9.567 2.575 6 13 
Market discipline 5.367 0.621 4 7 
Activity restrictions 2.297 0.634 1 3 
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis; Liquidity (first measure) = liquid assets/customer deposits & short term 
funding; Liquidity (second measure) = liquid assets/ total deposits & borrowed funds; 
Board size = number of directors in the board; Board independence = independent 
non-executive directors/total number of directors; Capitalization =  equity/total assets; 
Total assets = total bank assets; Provisions = loan loss provisions/total loans; Interest 
rate: the annual lending rate, Bank activity = bank claims to the private sector/GDP; 
Capital requirements: capital requirements index; Official supervisory power: official 
disciplinary power index; Market discipline: market discipline index; Activity 
restrictions: restrictions on banks activities index. Liquidity, Board independence, 
Capitalization, Loan loss provisions and Interest rate are expressed in % terms. 
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Table 2 
Correlation matrix 
 
Board 
size 
Board 
indep. Capital. Size Provis. Int. rate 
Bank 
activity 
Econ. 
growth 
Capital 
requir. 
Off. sup. 
power 
Market 
disciple. 
Activ. 
restrict. 
Board  size .1  00  0           
Board independence 0.073 1.000           
Capitalization -0.129 -0.143 1.000          
Size 0.448 0.088 -0.456 1.000         
Provisions -0.008 -0.127 0.490 -0.152 1.000        
Interest rate 0.078 -0.216 0.200 -0.179 0.017 1.000       
Bank activity -0.028 0.024 -0.157 0.071 0.002 -0.450 1.000      
Economic growth 0.010 0.120 0.006 0.087 -0.077 0.283 -0.016 1.000     
Capital requirements -0.160 -0.143 0.101 -0.119 0.014 0.196 0.026 0.496 1.000    
Official supervisory 
power -0.033 -0.027 0.030 0.281 -0.061 0.040 -0.487 0.254 0.304 1.000   
Market discipline 0.018 -0.044 0.133 -0.282 -0.039 0.189 0.241 0.091 0.106 -0.204 1.000  
Activity restrictions 0.030 -0.060 0.148 -0.178 -0.021 0.375 -0.831 -0.222 -0.284 0.213 0.037 1.000 
Notes: The table reports correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables used in our study. The Board size = number of directors in the board; Board 
independence = independent non-executive directors/total number of directors; Capitalization =  equity/total assets; Total assets = total bank assets; Provisions = 
loan loss provisions/total loans; Interest rate: the annual lending rate, Bank activity = bank claims to the private sector/GDP; Capital requirements: capital 
requirements index; Official supervisory power: official disciplinary power index; Market discipline: market discipline index; Activity restrictions: restrictions on 
banks activities index. 
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Table 2 
Bank liquidity and board characteristics 
 liquid assets/customer deposits & short-term funding liquid assets/ total deposits & borrowed funds  
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
 0.451***  0.444***     Lagged liquidity 
 (7.603)  (7.422)     
     0.602***  0.599*** Lagged liquidity 
     (10.828)  (10.759) 
-43.640** -32.740** -47.111** -35.023** -12.881** -13.639** -13.705** -13.309** Board size 
(-2.370) (-2.178) (-2.530) (-2.296) (-2.404) (-2.365) (-2.526) (-2.517) 
4.219 -0.432 -70.667** -70.386** 1.491 -0.066 -54.707*** -55.057*** Board independence 
-0.769 (-0.104) (-2.197) (-2.168) -0.972 (-0.030) (-2.902) (-2.990) 
  10.849** 10.056**   7.356** 7.916** Board independence  
squared   (1.974) (1.961)   (1.999) (2.093) 
169.44*** 269.42*** 175.41*** 264.63*** 191.18*** 182.75*** 211.17*** 214.52*** Capitalization 
(3.069) (6.849) (3.159) (6.686) (4.601) (4.036) (5.661) (5.795) 
-4.951 -4.094 -4.117 -2.438 -4.374** -13.220*** -4.367** -14.482*** Size 
(-3.219) (-3.016) (-3.257) (-3.390) (-2.455) (-5.248) (-2.446) (-5.536) 
0.094 0.062 0.091 0.064 -0.021 -0.037 0.002 -0.045 Provisions 
(1.610) (1.150) (1.550) (1.153) (-0.032) (-0.105) (0.001) (-0.139) 
4.736** 4.694** 4.876** 4.700** 1.479** 1.179** 1.520*** 1.182** Interest rate 
(2.290) (2.434) (2.357) (2.436) (2.542) (2.203) (2.609) (2.206) 
-27.337** 39.570*** -31.100*** -47.238*** -10.046*** -11.293*** -9.664** -14.194*** Bank activity 
(-2.486) (-3.574) (-2.669) (-3.812) (-2.609) (-2.806) (-2.543) (-3.206) 
1.031*** 1.178*** 1.028*** 1.338*** 0.855*** 0.915*** 0.867*** 1.066*** Economic growth 
(3.423) (3.022) (3.422) (3.292) (3.291) (3.818) (3.311) (3.949) 
27.107*** 24.642*** 27.003*** 25.453*** 13.842*** 14.556*** 13.807*** 14.892*** Capital requirements 
(2.806) (2.720) (2.724) (2.810) (3.015) (3.622) (3.002) (3.725) 
-6.484** -6.125*** -6.472*** -6.132*** -3.052** -3.305** -2.091* -3.410** Official supervisory 
power (-2.213) (-2.101) (-2.193) (-2.110) (-1.982) (-2.097) (-1.946) (-2.207) 
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29.138*** 30.005*** 28.541*** 29.432*** 14.025** 16.728** 13.852** 16.567** Market discipline 
(3.040) (2.910) (2.892) (2.679) (2.422) (2.556) (2.314) (2.505) 
-46.223*** -42.624*** -45.858*** -42.510*** -21.778*** -22.156*** -20.344*** -22.040*** Activity restrictions 
(-2.985) (-2.727) (-2.880) (-2.698) (-3.229) (-3.562) (-3.014) (-3.517) 
Observations 492 380 492 380 484 374 484 374 
Wald-test 30.278 578.426 31.677 578.467 29.810 172.710 30.842 175.893 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR1  0.005  0.007  0.010  0.009 
AR2  0.112  0.125  0.190  0.182 
Sargan test  0.282  0.275  0.305  0.192 
Notes: The table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. Equations I, III, V and VII are estimated using a panel data random effects model and the rest using the Blundell and Bond (1998) 
GMM method. Dependent variables: Liquid assets/customer deposits & short term funding (columns I-IV) and liquid assets/ total deposits & 
borrowed funds (columns V-VIII); Board size = number of directors in the board in logarithmic terms; Board independence = independent non-
executive directors/total number of directors; Capitalization = equity/total assets; Size = natural logarithm of total bank assets; Provisions = loan 
loss provisions/total loans; Interest rate: the annual lending rate; Bank activity = bank claims to the private sector/ GDP; Capital requirements: 
capital requirements index; Official supervisory power: official disciplinary power index; Market discipline: market discipline index; Activity 
restrictions: restrictions on banks activities index. P-values are reported for (i) the Wald test (goodness of fit of the equation), (ii) the AR1 and AR2 
tests of first and second order autocorrelation (second order autocorrelation should be rejected) and (iii) the Sargan test for overidentfying 
restrictions. 
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